Thursday, March 26, 2009

QOTD

Writer Michael Lewis says the "mass hysteria" over AIG bonuses obscures the underlying financial facts:
Every recriminatory bone in the political body is aroused; the one thing you can do right now in Washington without getting an argument is to rail against the ethics of AIG’s bonus payment.

Apart from Andrew Ross Sorkin at the New York Times, it occurs to no one to say that a) the vast majority of the employees at AIG had as little as you or I to do with its quasi-criminal risk taking and catastrophic losses; b) that the most valuable of those employees can easily find work at AIG’s competitors; and c) that if the government insists on punishing those valuable employees they will understandably leave, and leave behind a company even less viable than it is, and less likely to give the taxpayer back his money.

And also -- oh, yes -- that if the government can arbitrarily break contracts made by firms in which it has taken a stake no one in his right mind will ever again make a contract with one of those firms. And so all of the banks in which the government has investment will be damaged.

From this episode we can observe several general truths about the financial crisis, and the attempt to end it:
1) To the political process all big numbers look alike; above a certain number the money becomes purely symbolic. The general public has no ability to feel the relative weight of 173 billion and 165 million. You can generate as much political action and public anger over millions as you can over billions. Maybe more: the larger the number the more abstract it becomes and, therefore, the easier to ignore. (The trillions we owe foreigners, for example.)

2) As the financial crisis has evolved its moral has been simplified, grotesquely. In the beginning this crisis was messy. Wall Street financiers behaved horribly but so did ordinary Americans. Millions of people borrowed money they shouldn’t have borrowed and, not, typically, because they were duped or defrauded but because they were covetous and greedy: they wanted to own stuff they hadn’t earned the right to buy.

But now that taxpayer money is on the line the story has changed: innocent taxpayers are now being exploited by horrible Wall Street financiers. The guy who defaulted on mortgages on his six spec houses in the Nevada desert has turned himself into the citizen enraged by the bonuses paid to the AIG employees trying to sort out the mess caused by his defaults.
. . .Since the beginning of the crisis I’ve wondered why the government has found neither the will nor the way to attack the root of the problem -- the people who borrowed money to buy homes they shouldn’t have bought.

Now I think I understand. It would be too simple. People would understand a lot of small payments to the guy down the street who doesn’t deserve them, and become outraged. Far better to throw trillions at opaque corporations, the inner workings of which no one still really understands.
Agreed.

(via TigerHawk)

2 comments:

OBloodyHell said...

> And also -- oh, yes -- that if the government can arbitrarily break contracts made by firms in which it has taken a stake no one in his right mind will ever again make a contract with one of those firms.


This seems a questionable extention of what is done. There is a clear difference between breeaking an "internal" contract -- one between elements of the of the organization and the organization -- and between corporations external to the organization.

I am not saying I would put this beyond the attitude of the current admin, I'm just saying it's a definite boundary between what's being done (which I don't support, mind you) and what you are suggesting here.

OBloodyHell said...

> the easier to ignore. (The trillions we owe foreigners, for example.)

As I've noted in private communication, I think the actual trade imbalance is inaccurate because we woefully underestimate the value of our pirated IP. In actual fact, I suspect that the loss of value due to international piracy is anything but trivial (which does not point to more enforcement, which necessarily will be even less effective than drug control), and which points to the need to revamp the systems for measuring trade and exchange to more accurately assess the value these represent and also to set up mechanisms to assist in the application of such estimates to remedy the inaccurate wealth exchage metrics being produced.