Perched at an intersection on my customary path, I passed within a foot, intending neither debate nor distain. Suddenly, resolve faded, and I paused and asked: "Have you ever heard of the 'Just War Doctrine?'" No answer from see-, hear- or speak-no-evil; after a pause, the fourth answered, "War is never Just."
Instinct is powerful. Mouth agape, brain engaged, tongue primed, a rumble (verbal) was inevitable--but no, it wasn't worth the fight. Flight won, and I scurried a square-out and shuffled home. On my doorstep, finally, teeth and fingernails unclenched.
Quit mumbling; stop Googling--my DSM category is a debate for another day. Instead, I'm channeling frustration by launching a contest. The quiz question is this: "if peacenik agreed to read, what text (book, article, anything) would you select to maximize moving to maturity?" Pick your anti-Peter Pan potion in comments. Automatic disqualification for choosing your own blog.
My off-the-cuff answer addresses inaction in wartime, a long-time obsession. It's a short article by George Weigel, Senior Fellow of the Ethics and Public Policy Center, called Moral Clarity in a Time of War, 128 First Things 20 (January 2003):
As a tradition of statecraft, the just war argument recognizes that there are circumstances in which the first and most urgent obligation in the face of evil is to stop it. Which means that there are times when waging war is morally necessary to defend the innocent and to promote the minimum conditions of international order. This, I suggest, is one of those times. Grasping that does not require us to be "pagans." It only requires us to be morally serious and politically responsible. Moral seriousness and political responsibility require us to make the effort to "connect the dots" between means and ends.Like freedom of the seas, anti-genocide and similar customary international law, just war was both liberal and liberating. Once upon a time, lefties proudly stood with humanity and freedom.
Thus the just war tradition is best understood as a sustained and disciplined intellectual attempt to relate the morally legitimate use of proportionate and discriminate military force to morally worthy political ends. In this sense, the just war tradition shares Clausewitz’s view of the relationship between war and politics: unless war is an extension of politics, it is simply wickedness. For Robert Kaplan, Clausewitz may be an archetypal "pagan." But on this crucial point, at least, Clausewitz was articulating a thoroughly classic just war view of the matter. Good ends do not justify any means. But as Fr. Murray liked to say, in his gently provocative way, "If the end doesn’t justify the means, what does?" In the classic just war tradition of statecraft, what "justifies" the resort to proportionate and discriminate armed force–what makes war make moral sense–is precisely the morally worthy political ends being defended and/or advanced.
That is why the just war tradition is a theory of statecraft, not simply a method of casuistry. And that intellectual fact is the first thing about the just war tradition that must be retrieved today if we seek a public moral culture capable of informing the national and international debate about war, peace, and international order.
The second crucial idea to be retrieved in the contemporary renewal of the just war tradition is the distinction between bellum and duellum, between warring and "duelling," so to speak. As intellectual historian and just war theorist James Turner Johnson has demonstrated in a number of seminal works, this distinction is the crux of the matter in moral analysis. Bellum is the use of armed force for public ends by public authorities who have an obligation to defend the security of those for whom they have assumed responsibility. Duellum, on the other hand, is the use of armed force for private ends by private individuals. To grasp this essential distinction is to understand that, in the just war tradition, "war" is a moral category. Moreover, in the classic just war tradition, armed force is not inherently suspect morally. Rather, as Johnson insists, the classic tradition views armed force as something that can be used for good or evil, depending on who is using it, why, to what ends, and how.
Thus those scholars, activists, and religious leaders who claim that the just war tradition "begins" with a "presumption against war" or a “presumption against violence” are quite simply mistaken. It does not begin there, and it never did begin there. To suggest otherwise is not merely a matter of misreading intellectual history (although it is surely that). To suggest that the just war tradition begins with a "presumption against violence" inverts the structure of moral analysis in ways that inevitably lead to dubious moral judgments and distorted perceptions of political reality. . .
If the just war tradition is a theory of statecraft, to reduce it to a casuistry of means–tests that begins with a “presumption against violence” is to begin at the wrong place. The just war tradition begins by defining the moral responsibilities of governments, continues with the definition of morally appropriate political ends, and only then takes up the question of means. By reversing the analysis of means and ends, the “presumption against violence” starting point collapses bellum into duellum and ends up conflating the ideas of “violence” and “war.” The net result is that warfare is stripped of its distinctive moral texture. Indeed, among many American religious leaders today, the very notion of warfare as having a “moral texture” seems to have been forgotten.
No more. At best, today's progressives don't care. So let's launch the lefty desert island book list in comments, voting 'till Monday. Think of it as America's strategic persuasive reserve. It's foolproof--unless species Moonbats can't read.
3 comments:
Geez- this post is really sublime.
"The just war tradition begins by defining the moral responsibilities of governments, continues with the definition of morally appropriate political ends, and only then takes up the question of means. By reversing the analysis of means and ends, the “presumption against violence” starting point collapses.."
Good stuff.
Don't have a quote capturing Lincoln's transformation into a neo-con, but his February 27, 1860, speech at Cooper Union marks Lincoln as a Constitutional originalist:
"What is the frame of government under which we live?
The answer must be: "The Constitution of the United States." That Constitution consists of the original, framed in 1787, (and under which the present government first went into operation,) and twelve subsequently framed amendments, the first ten of which were framed in 1789.
Who were our fathers that framed the Constitution? I suppose the "thirty-nine" who signed the original instrument may be fairly called our fathers who framed that part of the present Government. It is almost exactly true to say they framed it, and it is altogether true to say they fairly represented the opinion and sentiment of the whole nation at that time. Their names, being familiar to nearly all, and accessible to quite all, need not now be repeated.
I take these "thirty-nine," for the present, as being "our fathers who framed the Government under which we live."
What is the question which, according to the text, those fathers understood "just as well, and even better than we do now?" . . .
Here, then, we have twenty-three out of our thirty-nine fathers "who framed the government under which we live," who have, upon their official responsibility and their corporal oaths, acted upon the very question which the text affirms they "understood just as well, and even better than we do now;" and twenty-one of them - a clear majority of the whole "thirty-nine" - so acting upon it as to make them guilty of gross political impropriety and willful perjury, if, in their understanding, any proper division between local and federal authority, or anything in the Constitution they had made themselves, and sworn to support, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the federal territories. Thus the twenty-one acted; and, as actions speak louder than words, so actions, under such responsibility, speak still louder."
> Good ends do not justify any means.
I think I've made this point here before, but this is actually incorrect.
Good Ends DO justify ANY means.
You just can't pick and choose among the ends resulting from those means.
You must recognize ALL the ends which result.
If you do this -- consider *EVERY* end which results, then yes, the ends can justify the means in each and every case.
That's where any moral quandary results -- most people only want to consider the ends which affect them and theirs, ignoring, often, not only the ends which happen to others, but also, in many cases, the longer-term effects those means have on just about everyone.
Slavery CAN be necessary, in some circumstances, as can War and just about any other generally undesirable human activity. Think of something you think can NEVER be justified, and I'll describe you a situation where it is still morally repugnant but still the better choice of two evils (not claiming that will be a likely event -- only one which is theoretically possible...
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