Fridays With Vic

Victor Davis Hanson was triumphant in his NRO article. But Hanson's the first to address critics of Bush/Rumsfeld's military plans and staffing:

Calls for a massive invasion force along the lines of the first Gulf War were rightly resisted. It made no sense to place half the combat strength of the United States in a narrow, vulnerable and pre-announced corridor in Kuwait. Given the fact the Iraqis were not quite hostiles or friends, but something in between like the Italians of World War II after the invasion of Sicily, a light, rapid force was preferable to a massive conventional armada.

Likewise, it was probably wise to ignore demands for a much larger subsequent occupation army, which would not only have created too high an infidel profile, but led to an intolerable imbalance in the ratio of support to combat troops. What we wished to avoid was the "light at the end of the tunnel" syndrome, reminiscent of the 500,000 Americans in Vietnam and a ten-pound Saigon-style American telephone book during 1967 that made the country no more safe than in 1973 when there were only a few thousand air troops involved. Constant requests for more manpower are often ipso facto proof that either strategy or generalship is wanting.

Read the whole thing.