Defending Rumsfeld

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's become the target-of-the-week, the product of a full-scale pile-on from the mainstream media, from conservative Senate iconoclasts like McCain, Hagel and Lott, and even from neo-con and Weekly Standard Editor William Kristol. (Fifteen other Republican Senators have publicly backed Rumsfeld, though the NY Times has declined to inform its readers of that fact.) According to USA Today, most Americans want Rumsfeld to resign.

NRO's Victor Davis Hanson says: "The demands for his head are to be laughed off from an unserious Maureen Dowd — ranting on spec about the shadowy neocon triad of Wolfowitz, Feith, and Perle — but taken seriously from a livid Bill Kristol or Trent Lott." Unlike Hanson, I can't even credit Lott or Kristol, for several reasons:

1. Resignations are atypical in America--and properly so: Calls for the Defense Secretary to resign are based on critiques of his leadership, as opposed to personal corruption. Andrew Sullivan's rationale is typical:

   Rumsfeld is ultimately responsible for the war. If Bremer called for the disbandment of the Baathist army and Rumsfeld objected, that army would still be intact. Bremer, remember, worked for Rumsfeld. If Rumsfeld had been over-ruled on such a critical matter, he should have quit. He didn't. He remains responsible. The Bush people can look the word "responsible" up in the dictionary if they need to.

   Without doubt, this argument carries a certain moral cache. But the syllogism’s a hold-over from English rule:

   In most of the parliamentary systems of Western Europe it is traditional that a politician resign when found to be seriously involved in dishonorable conduct. Improper behavior, let alone an illegal act, frequently leads to a formal and generally unreserved apology from the offending pol, followed by resignation from any positions of authority. Even major policy errors can result in the departure of a minister.

   That approach is rarely appropriate in America. In parliamentary systems--such as in Europe--when a Minister take responsibility for a subordinate's mistake and resigns, he remains a Member of Parliament and continues to participate in public governance. Not so in America, where resigning means a return to the private sector. Once gone, most former Executive Branch officials become pariahs--does anyone remember Mike Espy or Henry Cisneros, both Clinton Cabinet officials who left under a cloud? And Richard Nixon had to write a half-dozen serious books to get a reporter to return his call.
   
   I'm not saying Cabinet Secretaries have indefinite tenure, just that they're responsible to the President--and need not quit so long as they enjoy his confidence. Which Bush just re-affirmed:

   I believe he's doing a really fine job. Sometimes, perhaps, his demeanor is rough and gruff. But beneath that rough and gruff, no-nonsense demeanor is a good human being who cares deeply about the military and deeply about the grief that war causes.

2. The false food-fight about armor: Rumsfeld recently visited Iraq and briefed some of the troops, then took questions from the audience. Spc. Thomas Wilson asked about the alleged shortage of armor supplies, as Senator Kyl recounts:

   Secretary Rumsfeld is being criticized for his honest response to a soldier in a town-hall meeting in Iraq regarding the shortage of armor for our troops in the field. The secretary responded that you go to war with what you've got, not what you hope to have in the future. But he added that you also adjust to circumstances; and he said he was informed by his generals that the up-armoring was occurring as fast as possible.

   Predictably, the press went wild, and wrongly blamed Rummy:
   
   
   • Holding Rumsfeld responsible for insufficient armor is ironic. How quickly critics forget that Rumsfeld took office promising a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA). And President Bush backed RMA:

     [W]e must build forces that draw upon the revolutionary advances in the technology of war that will allow us to keep the peace by redefining war on our terms. I'm committed to building a future force that is defined less by size and more by mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to deploy and sustain, one that relies more heavily on stealth, precision weaponry and information technologies.

     So recent complaints are founded on turf-wars and spite, as David Ignatius says, "Advocates of the old, heavyweight Army have never forgiven Rummy for advocating lighter, more mobile forces, but Rumsfeld was correct." Senator McCain wants Rumsfeld's head today, but supported the Defense Secretary's plan in 2002:

     I would like to applaud your efforts to transform our Armed Forces. Our military must have the proper tools to face both today's threats as well as those in the future. . . .
     
     As Operation Enduring Freedom has proven, expeditionary warfare requires agility and rapid mobility. Weapon systems that cannot be placed into harm's way quickly are more of a hindrance than they are worth. The future will see our military operating in many unique areas and we must be prepared for that.
     
     I also want to congratulate you on your ‘Transforming the Military' article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs. Preparing for the future will, indeed, require ‘new ways of thinking,' and I hope Congress gets the message soon.

     So do I--starting with McCain.
   
   
   
   • The armor shortage is a hoax: Our forces already are armored, as Donald Sensing says:

     [O]f the unit's 830 vehicles, only 20 lacked armor when Wilson asked the question, and those 20 were "up armored" by the end of the next day. Wilson's question had nothing to do with their completion; they were already scheduled for completion.

     Rumsfeld himself rebutted the armor issue in Tuesday's USA Today:

     Our forces adapted to [the terrorists'] new tactics with a variety of changes in their tactics and procedures and also by increasing the production of armored Humvees, from about 35 per month to about 450 per month. In addition, Army experts designed armor kits to retrofit vehicles that were not designed for the added weight capability, and they were able to expand the civilian and military industrial base by several multiples of original capacity. In addition, the monthly production of personal body armor has been increased by more than twentyfold.
     
     A post-9/11 world has required the U.S. military to make many changes — changes that weren't contemplated in the heady years of the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War.

     And Rumsfeld's argument was confirmed in a Defense press conference last week:

     [I]t has not been a static battlefield. It's been a constantly evolving requirement. And it's our job not only to meet the requirement but then also to try to anticipate where it is and move our programs to support and anticipate requirements. . .
     
     Over the course of the last 18 months what we have is a consistent challenge, which is a very, very busy force that has a substantial number of combat systems operating across the tactical region. And what we have to do is grab them and up-armor them and recognize that there are different priorities based upon how pieces of equipment are being operated and what capacity we have to up-armor them.

   • There is no "right" answer to "how much armor": Armor systems are defensive weapons--with a down side, as Jeff Taylor explains in Reason magazine:

     [M]ore armor is not a magical solution, never has been. It is represents a trade-off between protection and mobility, just as in the age of knights when if the peasants managed to violently unhorse an up-armored foe, they could go off and have lunch and leave the knight flailing face down in the mud. If he didn't drown, you could always stab him in the eye-slits later.
     
     The preference for less armor can be seen today with at least some Marines in Fallujah. They point out that up-armoring their Humvees reduces the ability to see threats coming.

     Further, the trade-off has shifted during the course of the conflict, as Hanson explains:

     Humvees are transportation and support assets that traditionally have never been so protected. That the fluid lines in Iraq are different not just from those in World War II or Korea, but even Vietnam, Gulf War I, Mogadishu, and Afghanistan became clear only over months. Yet it also in fact explains why we are seeing 80 to 90 percent of these neo-Jeeps already retrofitted. In an army replete with Bradleys and Abramses, no one could have known before Iraq that Hummers would need to become armored vehicles as well. Nevertheless all of them will be in a fleet of many thousands in less than 18 months.

   • Our military doesn't blame Rumsfeld: The troops are better informed than any reporter. Here's a soldier who attended Rummy's briefing:

     In my opinion, it shows the attitude that this Secretary has towards the soldiers he is sworn to represent. It shows those in uniform that he does not see us or our concerns as "below his level," but instead sends a signal that we are his concern, and ensuring we can accomplish the mission is his highest priority.
     
     One more thing I would like to add is this, not one soldier present asked questions about why we were here, or expressed the sort of anti-war sentiment that Michael Moore led some to believe was prevalent in the military. Rather, the concern was about ensuring we would be supplied with all necessary equipment to accomplish the mission and return home safely. Let there be no doubt, this was not a hostile crowd eager to catch the Secretary of Defense off guard by grilling him with questions he has never had to answer. This was a group of truly admirable American's and patriots, receiving confirmation from the man who controls the Department of Defense, that we have the full fledged moral, financial and logistical support, to accomplish the mission.

     And here's another soldier:

     I have no doubt that one of SPC Wilson's superiors told him to go through a scrap yard to get more vehicle armor. There's nothing wrong with this- resourceful soldiers are always looking to improve on their equipment, weapons, fighting positions, etc. What SPC Wilson might not be aware of (at his level)- is that all vehicles that drive north into Iraq are required to have "level 3" armor protection. If a vehicle does not meet this standard, it will not be driven up north- it will be carried on a flatbed truck. Once in Iraq, armored vehicles are used for driving off post, and unarmored vehicles are used for driving around on post.

   • Why blame Rumsfeld at all?: Senator Kyl's right:

     The question is whether it is fair to heap all the blame on Secretary Rumsfeld for what is, after all, a procurement responsibility of the services. Ironically, another criticism of Secretary Rumsfeld is that he micromanages too much. Critics can't have it both ways.

     I agree with Glenn Reynolds's conclusion:

     Should we have more armor? Beats me. Are people who are using this issue as a way of unfairly portraying Rumsfeld as a heartless murderer of American troops way off-base? Yes. Absolutely.

3. Troop levels/effectiveness: This issue centers on the success of the war on terror. On that measure, Rummy's done a great job with available assets. And many of the Secretary's critics mistakenly have cried wolf before, argues Hanson: "Remember the pseudo-crises of the past four years — the quagmire in week three in Afghanistan or the sandstorm bog-down in Iraq?" Neither do I.
   
   Senator Kyl agrees:

   Sen. John McCain, for example, has long believed that the Iraq conflict required more troops from the outset, and he may be right. Reasonable people can disagree on this point. Secretary Rumsfeld made a decision to defer to what his commanders on the ground told him. That, too, is a perfectly logical decision. It should also be noted that troop levels were recently increased by 12,000, an increase Secretary Rumsfeld and his commanders agreed upon.

   Hanson notes the history behind the numbers:

   [The reality of troop levels] is far more complicated. Vietnam was no more secure with 530,000 American soldiers in 1968 than it was with 24,000 in 1972. How troops are used, rather than their sheer numbers, is the key to the proper force deployment — explaining why Alexander the Great could take a Persian empire of 2 million square miles with an army less than 50,000, while earlier Xerxes with 500,000 on land and sea could not subdue tiny Greece, one-fortieth of Persia's size.
   
   Offensive action, not troop numbers alone, creates deterrence; mere patrolling and garrison duty will always create an insatiable demand for ever more men and an enormously visible American military bureaucracy — and a perennial Iraqi dependency on someone else to protect the nascent democracy.
   
   In truth, the real troop problem transcends Iraq. Our shortages are caused by a military that was slashed after the Cold War and still hasn't properly recouped to meet the global demands of the war against Islamic fascism — resulting in rotation nightmares, National Guard emergencies, and stop-order controversies... In reality, [Rumsfeld] has carefully allotted troops in Iraq because he has few to spare elsewhere — and all for reasons beyond his control.

   The WSJ agrees that numbers aren't necessarily the answer:

   the number of U.S. troops on the ground matters much less than the intelligence our forces can get from Iraqis. We could have half a million troops there and they wouldn't do much good if they didn't know where to find the "former regime elements." The Pentagon strategy of training Iraqis to fight with us is exactly correct, even if the effort began much later than it should have.

   Today's armchair generals forget that, in addition to hell, war is chaos. Plans rarely survive first blood. The strentgh of America's military isn't (or isn't solely) planning, but adaptability, especially at the NCO level. As Glenn Reynolds observes:

   I remain unconvinced that we need more troops in Iraq. Afghanistan saw successful elections with far fewer U.S. troops. I'm not convinced that we don't, but we'd need a million troops to blanket all the polling places,and we're not going to have that. So what's the mission? Just as one seldom wins a war by slapping armor on everything (and no army in history has armored all its soldiers and transport vehicles), one seldom wins a war by dispersing forces to lots of locations in a "prevent" defense. That seems to be what the "more troops" crowd has in mind, but it strikes me as a poor idea.
   
   It's quite hard for me to judge Rumsfeld's performance, but it's not so hard for me to see that a lot of the attacks on Rumsfeld seem to be opportunistic and dishonest.

4. Using an Autopen: Some Republicans and Democratics in Congress, plus former Defense Secretary Cohen, fault Rumsfeld for not personnally signing the condolence letters to the family members of U.S. troops killed in action. Rumsfeld instead had a machine affix his signature.
   
   Words fail me. What does this have to do with Rumsfeld or war? I agree with Kevin at Wizbang:

   Of all the criticisms of Sec Rumsfeld, the whole autopen thing -like the people pushing it- is completely stupid. . . . These jackasses are so busy trying to make stupid political points when there are none to be made that when and if this nation has real problems (like a freaking war on terror) they will be ignored.

5. Conclusion: According to Frank Gaffney:

   Donald Rumsfeld may not be perfect, but neither are any of his critics. He is nonetheless arguably the finest secretary of defense this nation has ever had. His combination of vast expertise, unflagging energy and strategic vision would be desirable under any circumstances. In time of global war, though, they are truly indispensable.

   Since Donald Rumsfeld became Secretary of Defense, the United States has toppled the Taliban and Saddam, tracked and killed thousands of terrorists and helped prevent further attacks in the United States. I can't improve on Hanson's summary: "have we forgotten what Mr. Rumsfeld did right?"

More:

A must read email from Captain Dan Mattson in Iraq:

[T]he young soldier, who had just lost his left hand and right eye from an explosion, came to the defense of the Secretary of Defense, stating "Mr. Rumsfeld, I want you to know, that you are doing a fantastic job. I know that you are taking a lot of heat for the problems with getting armor for vehicles. I want you to know that things are vastly improved. Our vehicles are great, and I have never searched through junk piles for scrap metal."

At this point, Rumsfeld looked choked up, and I had a lump in my throat and and watery eyes. It was moving. What makes a man who has been so close to death, and maimed for life, come to the defense of the Army's highest ranking official? Loyalty, I dare say. Did Rob think Mr. Rumsfeld was having a self-esteem problem? In his greatest hour of need, his thoughts went to the emotional needs of another. I found it quite amazing, and moving.

(via Instapundit)